A right to culture may be a rhetorical figure meant to signal a significant ideological commitment. As an ideological commitment, the right to culture may take the form of a general commitment to learn about and respect the cultural traditions of various culturally distinct groups in a society. It would counsel tolerance of cultural difference and an embrace of a multicultural society; it would stand in opposition to the policies of national assimilation that have so often characterized the nation states of the West. This strikes me as a sensible (though not unassailable) ideological commitment; it is not the focus on my discussion herein.
Often, however, the term "right" is not meant loosely or figuratively; indeed a number of governments or quasi governmental organizations have adopted formal "rights to culture" that anticipate some institutional enforcement mechanism: litigation, administrative dispute resolution, or formal sanctions.
This suggests a vague but pervasive ideological commitment, backed by a embryonic jurisprudence. Here, "culture" is understood to be an important value that decent societies must protect against infringement or dilution, and it is urged that the formal power of government should be deployed in the service of such protection.
Formally, we can imagine two broad categories of activity or regulation that might be invalidated by a right to culture: "public" regulation promulgated by the state-law and 2 legislation-and "private" regulations or policies of certain actors in the institutions of the market economy (typically such laws might apply to employers, private universities and schools, landlords and proprietors of public accommodations such as restaurants, theaters and hotels). The former might be described as rights-against-government and the latter as rights-against private institutions.
Normatively it may matter a great deal whether the right in question is good against government or against private actors.
There are other complexities. For instance, it will not be at all an easy matter to determine which group practices are considered "culture" for purposes of legal enforcement of a right to culture. In the broadest sense any social practice that is not universally shared among humankind is a product of "culture." "Culture" include practices that are relatively trivial and unworthy of judicial attention as well as practices that are potentially socially destructive. The American custom of drinking coffee (too often bad coffee) with milk or cream along with dessert rather than espresso coffee after dessert is "culture" and so are the American practices of capital punishment and wide availability of firearms. A formal right to culture cannot employ such a capacious definition of culture, yet practical, working definitions of culture are surprisingly scarce.
These cavils aside, my primary concern herein is that cultural rights and especially the ideas about group difference and culture on which they often are premised may be socially destructive in the context of a relatively small and interdependent democratic institution such as a city. This is a different matter than saying that the cultural practices of certain "cultural minorities" are per se socially destructive, as I will make clear.
My working hypothesis is that multicultural cities are the vital site of a potentially creative and also potentially destructive tension. They are multicultural on the one hand: polyglot, cosmopolitan, fractured into sub groups by race, ethnicity, custom, economic class and ideology. This suggests an inevitable divergence of opinions, experiences and ways of life, a divergence that will nurture sub group affiliations and loyalties at the expense of understanding, trust and familiarity across the sub groups. They are cities on the other hand: the customary location of small scale, if not face-to-face, participatory democracy. The city-state of the middle ages and Renaissance, the early American town studied by Alexis de Tocqueville and the regional governments of the Italian federalist reform of the 1970s all suggest the importance of smaller, more manageable and more participatory forms of government. And a crucial feature of this smaller scale government is social trust-precisely what the fragmentation of multiculturalism can make difficult to achieve and at worst unavailable.
The Value of Civic Enterprise:
In a (perhaps romanticized) past, great cities inspired collective pride and one of the functions of city government was to encourage citizens to participate in great common projects to the benefit of all. People remarked in admiration and awe at public projects such as bridges, subways, parks, waterways, ports and civic buildings. People beamed with pride at civic culture: museums, public events and the lively arts.
But today any ambitious public project is immediately bogged down in ideological conflict that is often fatal: How can you celebrate Columbus when he was a imperialist who smoothed the way for the oppression of indigenous peoples? How can you be proud of destroying the natural landscape to build a dam, bridge or a freeway? How can you justify spending public money on the bourgeois Opera or Museum of Fine Arts when grass roots folk music/feminist free verse poetry/ ethnic interpretive dance languishes for lack of support? These questions, and many others like them, are good questions that need to be asked.
But too often, we are quick to point out the inevitable incompleteness or bias of any public vision and slow to notice the erosion of the public sphere that comes from no vision or an anti-vision. Without such collective projects and social vision we are without any sense of participation in the civic life of the cities in which we live.
But of course, explicit public vision comes with certain risks. Utopian urban planning, for instance, has often ignored urban diversity and the vibrancy of city street life, imposing instead a uniform, theoretically pure master plan that crushed anything it could not assimilate. Literally scores of authors have commented on the destructive "purity" of modernist city planning. The exemplary prototype was Baron Haussmann's remaking of Parisian neighborhoods during France's Second Empire, through which the winding pathways of old Paris (and the buildings that lined them) were made to yield to Corbusier's modernist plan for Paris was (mercifully) never realized, but a visit to Styvusant Town in New York City would make one think that the Ville Radieuse 5 had found a home in the New World. Some of these civic visions are of such inspired beauty that one cannot help but think it worth the loss (marvel at Place de Concorde and tell me you long for the fetid labyrinth of medieval Paris); others are a crime against the social fabric and an assault on the eye; still others simply incomplete and abandoned, a betrayal of the public trust and an insult to the lives they displaced.
But the attempts to control such civic enterprises by tying the hands of government have not eliminated the type of violent displacement that the critics of utopian planning deplore. Instead, the displacement now occurs under the guise of "efficiency, " or the market, rather than under the rubric of progress or urban beautification. The imperialism now occurs through market forces and malign neglect: shopping malls and office complexes replace highways and public works as the engines of displacement; the corporate headquarters as a monument to capital replaces the public sculpture as a monument to the civic hero or heroine. While modern urban planning threatened to destroy communities in the name of the Ville Radieuse, today the ethnic neighborhood is slowly destroyed through disinvestment and neglect or displaced by gentrification and spiraling rents: housing abandonment or condominium conversions replace the wrecking ball and the bulldozer of urban renewal.
In the United States, a combination of left wing skepticism of "cultural imperialism" and neo-conservative hostility to government enterprise generally have combined to 5 discredit many civic projects. But the retreat from governmental planning and civic vision has not left the city "free" to develop naturally or in response to organic social groups and social interactions. Instead, when civic vision has been abandoned, the state has quietly ceded the field to a destructive clash of covert plans and anti-plans: the acquisitive frenzy of the real estate speculator and the reactionary populism of the selfish or frightened homeowner.
What is needed, then, is not a return to imperialistic planning, but a new if tentative vision. A vision that is coherent, yet open to revision, a vision that is confident, but not arrogant, a vision that is inspiring but does not descend into demagoguery. Such a vision is not imposed from above, but rather is assembled, piece by piece from the fragments of our collective aspirations and ideals.
The Common Good?
Cities need common enterprises and civic vision in order to be livable cities. They also need common civic enterprises and a belief in "the common good" in order to be effective local democracies according to a significant number of social scientists and political theorists. Consider the following statement from the political science Robert
Putnam:
In the civic community… citizens pursue what Tocqueville termed "self interest properly understood, that is, self interested defined in the context of broader public needs, self interest that is "enlightened" rather than "myopic, " self interest that is alive to the interests of others. [By contrast] [t]he absence of civic virtue is exemplified in…"amoral familism"…"Maximize the material, short-term advantage of the nuclear family; assume all others will do like-wise…. Citizens in a civic community, though not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more than a battleground for pursuing personal interest. 6 Civic virtue's enlightened self interest requires a commitment to a public sphere and public values shared by all, or at least the vast majority of citizens. Divergence of opinions and views are to be expected, but at the same time there must be some conception of the common good that is widely shared. We may disagree about whether 6 to prioritize, say, public education over police. We may fight to the bitter end over the issue. But we need to share some at least vague sense of what would make ours a "better city" (better public education and more effective police). Things would become much more problematic if a significant group of citizens thought children should learn on the job as apprentices or if a large faction thought crime prevention better left to private vigilantes. They would be worse yet if some people didn't care about education at all or sided with the criminals on the belief that private property is immoral. In these latter cases, we would not have routine political disputes and divergent preferences-precisely what a well functioning government and a free market are supposed to mediate-but rather something like a radical disjuncture in terms of the grammar in which the common good is imagined.
Even if each group perceives its goals as compatible with its conception of the common good, outsiders may (mis)perceive those goals as a reflection of what Putnam calls "amoral familism". Lack of understanding and real, at times radical, divergence in conceptions of the good may erode public trust, encourage citizens to abandon public virtue and instead "maximize the material, short-term advantage of the nuclear family" (or ethnic group) while also promoting the self fulfilling view that "all others will do the same." Multiculturalism in its stronger manifestations seems to threaten this, and multicultural rights, in their stronger manifestations threaten to entrench it.
Rights Assertion and the Habits of Citizenship.

Consider another of Putnam's findings:
Citizenship in the civic community entails equal rights and obligations for all. Such a community is bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency. Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners.7
In the classical liberal model, rights are a precondition to effective citizenship: civil rights secure the political equality of citizens that distinguishes democracy from aristocracy and civil liberties allow citizens participate in politics without fear of reprisals from the 7 individuals currently in control of the formal power of the state. In this model, formal rights assertion against government or private actors should be extraordinary. For the most part, rights should function in the background, as guarantors of equality and liberty whose effectiveness is reflected in the fact that they rarely need be evoked formally.
When this is true, we needn't pay much attention to the effects of formal rights assertion on the "habits of citizenship".
But multicultural rights are predicated on the political powerlessness of minority cultural groups: because the minority groups are likely to be the victims of illegitimate bias, their legitimate interests are likely to be systematically undervalued by most citizens. Here rights are not a background norm underlying democratic politics, but instead a corrective to a failed or degenerate democracy, as a fix for "process failure" in the language of legal theorist John Hart Ely. In this "process failure" model, rights assertion becomes an alternative to democracy for groups who are likely to systematic losers in majoritarian politics. As such, rights assertion may become a frequent event in the collective life of these sub groups and these groups may come to define their role as citizens, primarily in terms of the act of rights assertion before courts, rather than as participants in political dialogue with other citizens. At this point we may worry, in Putnam's terms, that the "horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation" necessary to good citizenship will become supplanted by "vertical relations of authority and dependency" between subjects dependent on the authority of courts or governmental bureaucracies that enforce rights to culture.
This isn't to suggest that minority rights are never necessary; indeed such rights are essential to realize the promise of multicultural cities, as I will argue below. But minority rights must not become a substitute for engagement with the rough and tumble of democratic politics. Political dialogue empowers members of minority sub groups as equal participants in a political process and thereby fosters horizontal relationships among citizens rather than vertical relationships between individuals and the administrative or judicial institutions that enforce rights to culture. Political dialogue can be an opportunity to foster mutual trust between the ethnic groups which make up a city; by negotiating cultural differences, groups may come to understand that group based differences are not as severe as they imagined and that members of other ethnic groups 8 are people of good will who can be enlisted in mutually beneficial enterprises for the common good.
This leads us to another of Putnam's observations:
Participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors. Moreover, when individuals belong to "cross-cutting" groups with diverse goals and members, their attitudes will tend to moderate as a result of group interaction and cross pressures… associationism is a necessary precondition for effective self-governance.8
Political organizing around specific social practices, rather than litigation asserting rights to "culture", might foster coalitional politics and the "cross cutting" group membership that Putnam and others suggest will help produce more moderate attitudes.
For instance, recent immigrants might ally themselves with local religious minorities in order to lobby for, say the accommodation of distinctive apparel in public schools (as was at issue in the famous French "affair of the head scarves" in which French school authorities forbade the wearing of headscarves and other religious dress in public school), or with organized labor to press for a generally applicable autonomy over grooming and dress or for flexible work schedules (to accommodate religious or cultural rituals or traditions) in employment contexts. In the process they will often need to compromise in order to maintain a successful alliance.
Such a compromise is more likely to experienced as voluntarily chosen in the way many politically necessary compromises are ("on balance, the compromise was worth it") leading to the mediation of attitudes Putnam describes. By contrast, if a court offers a compromise (say, in the form of a limited cultural rights protection) it may be experienced by the group as a betrayal of their "true" culture or even as a form of compulsory assimilation imposed by a judicial system that is, after all, thoroughly implicated in the norms of the dominant culture.
"Cultural Difference" as a Threat to Civic Dialogue and Sound Policy
What is important to notice is that none of the problems I have identified make reference to the specific features of any cultural tradition. The claim here is not that certain cultural traditions are incompatible with democracy, capitalism or political 9 liberalism because, for instance, they're too hierarchical, too theocratic, too communal and therefore fail to respect individual autonomy, disregard the equality of women, etc.
As a general matter I often find such claims wildly overbroad, alarmist, inattentive to similarities between the "alien" practices and values and readily available analogous
Western practices and values and quite often just plain bigoted, (although, in certain contexts, the claims strike me as quite plausible.) For my purposes in this essay I'm agnostic as to these claims.
My claim is that the mere perception of cultural difference and the resulting social divisions-objective and imagined-can trouble democratic institutions and enterprises that require social trust and even a thin commitment to shared ideals. At the same time there may be somewhat less than meets the eye to the crisis multiculturalism presents in terms of conflicts involving actual social practices (as opposed to widespread perceptions of difference.) To be sure, modern cities consist of people with divergent goals, ideals and conceptions of the good life, but this is type of conflict that liberal democratic institutions are designed to mediate My hypothesis is that perception of group cultural difference-a sort of "difference panic" on the part of some and fetishization and valorization of group difference on the part of others--may be much more destructive of civic enterprises than the normative conflict generated the actual practices of various social groups. If so, then the discourse surrounding "multicultural rights" may be a part of the problem, not so much because multicultural rights "go too far" (or because opposition to cultural rights is unacceptably intolerant) but because the arguments for and against cultural rights share a socially destructive and at least overblown (if not downright incorrect) presumption: that "cultural" conflict is novel and unprecedented because, unlike garden variety forms of social conflict, cultural conflict involves a clash of radically divergent, incompatible, mutually inscrutable and incommensurable value systems.
Cultural difference rhetoric (pro and con) encourages us to see social conflicts in terms of inscrutable group difference. But often, conflicts filed under the label "cultural difference" are better understood in terms of the type of ideological or normative conflict that democracies and markets routinely mediate. Often the reason a social practice in another culture is disturbing is because it is uncomfortably similar to a controversial practice internal to "our own" culture. In these cases, practices that could be dealt with under existing laws and procedures are unnecessarily complicated by the introduction of a rhetoric of cultural difference.
For instance, the ongoing public outcry over female circumcision is generally presented as a case of "cultural difference." The rhetoric evokes traditional cultural and religious values in need of protection from "western cultural imperialism" or, alternatively, savage African or brutal Islamic practices that the "civilized world" should unite to combat. This framing, encouraged by both those who would defend the practice (or practices) as "cultural traditions" and those who would forbid them as barbaric, clouds the issue and blind us to reasonable policy solutions.
For instance, when doctors in Seattle area hospitals began encountering requests for female circumcision from Somali immigrants in the mid 1990s, the hospitals formed a committee to study the issue. The committee found that refusal to consider performing the practice would lead many to attempt to perform it outside the hospital setting, either at home or in their native country, both options that would often involve severe procedures under unsanitary conditions. By contrast, the committee discovered that a quite small ritual cut in the tissue surrounding the clitoris would satisfy the Somalis cultural and religious needs while leaving only small scar and resulting in little or no long term loss of sensation, sexual function or lasting physical trauma. An obstetrician/ gynecologist opined that such a procedure would be less traumatic than the male circumcisions performed as a matter of course on new-born boys in the United States. 9
A form of civic dialogue that emerged in a local context in which the conflict actually arose and that focused on the specific practice at issue, rather on sweeping ideas of cultural difference, enabled the Somalis and the American doctors arrive at a solution that satisfied both Somali traditions and American norms and laws.
Nevertheless, driven by the fear of a "barbaric" (this term was used to describe the Somalis with shocking confidence and regularity) foreign culture, opponents lobbied for and secured the passage a sweeping federal law that arguably prohibits any form of "female circumcision. The federal law potentially undermines the hard won compromise This example demonstrates that the rhetoric of "cultural difference" that cultural rights discourse encourages doesn't necessarily lead to the preservation of minority cultural practices. It can lead us either to turn a blind eye to a practice that we should confront and condemn ("it's 'their culture' and therefore not our concern") or to
prematurely condemn a practice we should seek to understand ("it's 'barbaric' and an assault on our values.") Regardless of whether one favors or opposes the practice in question, little is gained by shrouding a social practice in the rhetoric of "cultural difference," a rhetoric that too often suggests that we are incapable of evaluating the practice in a context specific way, as we would any other social practice. We should confront disquieting and controversial practices in their specifics as a practices that occur in our society, rather than attempt to establish a distance from them by describing them as alien and foreign.
Cultural differences in and of themselves do not pose a threat to the type of civic dialogue that theorists such as Putnam see as central to making local democracy work.
What does pose a threat to civic dialogue is the belief that "culture" provides an excuse to opt out of the dialogue and resort to premature defiance or premature coercion. We can and we must engage in dialogue (and when necessary face conflict) concerning social practices about which people will differ. In this sense, "cultural difference" is simply the latest manifestation of that most ancient political dilemma: how can a just society manage desires of citizens with incompatible visions of the good? 13
Mediation of Cultural Conflict Through Political Dialogue
Notice how the tensions between cultural difference and civic virtue are attenuated by Cultural rights might bolster a practice that is under attack within an ethnic group and thereby unwittingly take sides in an "internal" dispute; by contrast, an effective political dialogue can allow such divergent voices within cultural groups a platform from which to speak, in some cases lessening the apparent tension between the norms of various groups in a society and facilitating a richer and more nuanced understanding of group cultural practices.
Political dialogue can be an opportunity for groups to come to understand each other and may help the group that loses a political conflict better accept the outcome. In some cases a group that fails to convince its fellow citizens of the merits of a cultural practice may come away somewhat more receptive to a generally applicable prohibition if their members were involved a conversation about the rationale for the prohibition. Political dialogue can educate recent immigrants as to the norms and values that are dominant in their new or temporary homes; in many cases newcomers are happy to comply with social norms when they know of and understand them.
Consider the following case. Two arranged marriages involving two girls of 13 and 14 years and two men roughly twice their age took place in the state of Nebraska 14 .
After local law enforcement was informed of the incident, the father of the two girls, a refugee from Iraq, was charged with criminal child abuse and the grooms, fellow Iraqis, were charged with statutory rape for consummating the "marriages" on their wedding 14 night. The girls were taken into the protective custody of the state. The lawyer for the Iraqi men reported that none of them could understand why they were arrested: they were simply unaware that the marriage was illegal and that sexual intercourse between "married" minors and adults was considered criminal sexual assault. According to a friend of the accused men, "They were only doing what we have done for centuries. This is not a case of disrespect for the law. We did not know the law." Another friend who became a sort of unofficial spokesperson for the accused men added "But now that we know there will be no more incidents. We love this country." There are good reasons to think that a marriage involving a 14 year old is problematic. But it is not clear why it is more problematic when it arises from the traditions of rural Iraqis than when it arises from the traditions of rural Americans. The Nebraska controversy raised difficult legal and moral issues, but none of the issues were unprecedented or unique to "multiculturalism." Multicultural rhetoric led the media and local law enforcement into a sort of "difference panic." Viewed through lens of cultural difference, the practice could only be seen as the effect of an inscrutable foreign culture.
At this point only two options are cognizable: protect the practice under the rubric of cultural autonomy, or prohibit it as inconsistent with the norms of Western civilization.
Either outcome is destructive of social trust because either outcome reinforces the idea that the sub-group is radically distinct from the "mainstream" of society, they are in but never of the local and national community. Viewed through this lens, the sub group is either a candidate for liberal noblesse oblige manifested in cultural rights or for isolation and suspicion as a foreign contagion that threatens the community character.
If, by contrast, the local Nebraska authorities had viewed the practice of underage "marriages" without prejudice, several equitable solutions suggest themselves. First and most obviously, take pains to educate newcomers of the applicable marriage and statutory rape laws. More controversially, exercise case-by-case prosecutorial discretion in dealing with child endangerment/abuse and statutory rape violations that involve good faith mistakes about the governing legal norms. The maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is routinely honored in the breach: to be blunt, I find it hard to imagine that an Finally, and again more controversially, enforce the governing law and prosecute willful violations accordingly. Newcomers have the right to expect that they will be treated equitably and they have the right to attempt to change laws they find inappropriate or burdensome through the political process. They don't have the right to expect established laws, norms and mores to change to suit them or to demand exceptions to generally applicable rules. In this respect, the adage, "when in Rome, do as the Romans 
Status-based Discrimination as an Impediment to Successful Integration
Although it would require a separate essay to even summarize the argument, it is long established in liberal societies that there is a relevant distinction between discrimination on the basis of status or group membership and "discrimination" on the basis of behavior or practices. While discrimination based on status is understood to be illegitimate with rare exceptions, in a sense, discrimination on the basis of behavior is the sine qua non of law. My suggestion that formal cultural rights (in the form of demands for accommodation of distinctive practices) should be approached with caution and attention to the potential costs in terms of civic trust does not suggest circumspection toward more traditional civil rights prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ascriptive social statuses such as race and national origin. These statements suggest that robust prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of statuses such as race, religion and national origin may be a precondition to effective social integration and necessary to foster social trust between ethnic and cultural groups.
They also suggest that compromise and negotiation of the conflicts surrounding cultural practices are possible: if offered a consistent message and a realizable goal, recent immigrants would be happy in many cases to integrate into a multicultural society, even at the expense of some traditional practices.
Assimilation and the Promise of Multicultural Cities
At this point it bears noting that some degree of assimilation is arguably an indispensable component of modern nationalism generally, whether it involves "foreign" that is at the heart of national unification and the so far unsuccessful assimilation of contemporary multiculturalism is precisely that of racism and status hierarchy.
Recall that the foregoing analysis doesn't rely on reference to any specific cultural practice or norm: the claim is not that certain cultural traditions are incompatible with democracy or capitalism and political liberalism because, for instance, they're too hierarchical, too theocratic, too communal, disregard the equality of women, etc. Instead, it's the perception of cultural difference as an unprecedented phenomenon involving radically alien practices and inscrutable beliefs that threatens social trust and the conditions favorable to civic virtue. My argument doesn't suggest that cultural rights are dangerous because they protect inherently dangerous practices, but rather that they are dangerous because they are premised on the view that conflicts involving practices identified with ethnic sub-groups are distinct from the run-of-the-mill political and ideological conflicts that complex societies routinely confront. Cultural rights presume that group cultural differences are fixed and therefore the inevitable basis of social division. Based on this presumption, they foreclose many of the numerous mechanisms Sound utopian? Well, I do use the term assimilation, and I use it advisedly. I don't imagine we can have the kind of multicultural civic community I've described without some changes; changes that some will find unwelcome. Some sacred cows would have to be butchered, some ritual daggers pounded into ploughshares. And while the polyglot society would to some extent be mix of all the various cultures in a society, let's not fool ourselves: there's simply no way to guarantee that each group will have equal influence.
Larger groups, more established groups and groups with disproportionate economic and social influence will have more power to shape the direction of a common multicultural society than recent immigrants with little wealth or social prestige. From the perspective of cultural rights, this is an injustice; I fear it is an injustice law and social policy cannot easily remedy.
Moreover, much of what animates cultural rights is the desire for group selfperpetuation: it not simply a desire to have equal influence over a polyglot society but a desire to remain distinctive. It's not an accident that all of the examples of cultural conflicts I've offered have involved marriage, procreation, children or sexuality. These issues are of central importance because they involve more than simple conflicts between legally competent, adults; they also involve a struggle over the affiliations and socialization of future generations. They are about the future of societies, the continuity of civilizations and the survival of ethnic groups as groups.
For instance, arranged marriage is an especially potent symbol of multicultural conflict because it implicates a practice that is valued not only for its own sake but also as a means of maintaining a common group identity. For some immigrant communities, arranged marriage may take on greater importance in the host country than it ever had "at home" because without it there would be no certain means of ensuring a connection between subsequent generations born in the West and the old country. The stakes of the conflict are "cultural survival." As the philosopher Anthony Appiah argues:
the desire for survival is not simply the desire that the culture that gives meaning to the lives of currently existing individuals should continue for them, but requires the continued existence of the culture through indefinite future generations…. Let me stress first that the indefinite future generations in question should be the descendants of the current population. The desire for the survival of the… identity is not the desire that there should always be people somewhere who speak that …language and practice those … practices… A proposal to [pay]… a group of unrelated people to carry on [the] culture on some island in the South Pacific simply would not meet the need.
This matters because it seems to me not at all clear that this aim is one that we can acknowledge while respecting the autonomy of future generations. 17
Arranged marriage is perhaps an emblematic multicultural conflict precisely because it implicates the ability of groups to perpetuate group customs and affiliations intergenerationally and the often very strongly held aversion to such intergenerational control in liberal societies. There are very good reasons for liberal societies to prohibit marriages involving children unable to make autonomous decisions and to encourage people to socialize across of ethnically-defined lines. While ethnic sub groups are entitled to promote group solidarity through voluntary association, it is not at all clear that they are entitled to hinder younger generations from considering and pursuing alternative affiliations, lifestyles and relationships outside the group. An inevitable and perhaps desirable result of growing up in a multicultural society will be the gradual erosion of some of the most distinctive elements of ethnic group culture and the supplementation of ethnic group affiliations with new, more cosmopolitan modes of action, beliefs and ways of life.
It's precisely the possibility of this type of slow erosion of group identity that many would like to forestall with cultural rights. It seems to me such desires, while understandable, are not desires liberal societies can accommodate. And perhaps it bears noting that even this characteristic demand of cultural difference is, in one sense, not unique to cultural minorities. Parents everywhere and of all races, creeds and classes, desperately wish for more control over their children than modern, dynamic, cosmopolitan and liberal societies can offer or are prepared to yield to them.
Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are increasingly the conditions of our age.
We will do better to confront and manage the conflicts that arise with compassion, equity and pragmatism than to attempt to banish them with absolutes, be it rigid prohibitions or indiscriminate accommodations and entitlements. 
